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ABSTRACT 
We study the returns to human capital for workers observed in Tunisian matched worker-firm data in 
1999. This tells us how these returns differ from those obtained in industrialised countries with 
matched data. We develop a new method based on multivariate analysis of firm characteristics, which 
allows us most of the benefits obtained by introducing firm fixed effects in wage equations for 
studying the effect of education. It also provides a human capital interpretation of these firm effects. 
Moreover, using three firm characteristics easily collectable yields results close to those obtained by 
using the matched structure of the data. Wage regressions including the computed factors confirm that 
human capital is associated with positive intra-firm externality on wages. Therefore, a given worker 
would be more productive and better paid in an environment strongly endowed in human capital. 
However, the poorest workers do not take advantage of human capital in the firm. Conversely, the 
poor benefit from working in the textile sector in terms of wages unlike the middle and high wage 
workers.  
Keywords: wage, returns to human capital, matched worker-firm data, quantile regressions, factor 
analysis, Tunisia 
RÉSUMÉ 
Nous analysons les rendements du capital humain à partir de données liées employeurs-employés 
collectées en Tunisie en 1999 et indiquons comment ces rendements diffèrent de ceux généralement 
obtenus dans les pays industrialisés avec ce type de données. Nous développons une nouvelle méthode 
fondée sur une analyse factorielle des caractéristiques d'entreprise qui rapproche nos résultats, en ce 
qui concerne le rendement de l’éducation, de ceux que l'on obtient en utilisant des équations de salaire 
à effets fixes d'entreprise. Notre technique d'estimation fournit une interprétation de ces effets en 
distinguant l'impact sur les salaires du capital humain propres aux établissements. En outre, l'inclusion 
dans l'analyse de trois caractéristiques d'entreprise facilement mobilisables procure des résultats très 
proches de ceux obtenus lorsque toute l'information disponible sur la structure d'appariement des 
données est utilisée. L'introduction de l'approche factorielle confirme l'idée selon laquelle le capital 
humain peut constituer une source positive d'externalité intra entreprise. Un travailleur d'une 
qualification donnée serait plus productif et donc mieux rémunéré dans un environnement fortement 
doté en capital humain. Toutefois, les travailleurs pauvres ne semblent pas pouvoir bénéficier des 
qualifications de leur entreprise. En revanche, les pauvres profitent d'un emploi dans le secteur des 
textiles en termes de rémunération, contrairement aux travailleurs à salaires médians et élevés.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Worker or firm knowledge? 
Returns to human capital and skills have always been considered dominant explanations for labour 
compensation. Accordingly, they have been incorporated in individual wage equations by using 
regressors describing schooling and the worker’s experience2. This is particularly important for 
developing countries where the returns to education are expected to be higher3. A variety of human 
capital indicators have been used for this purpose, although it is fair to say years of schooling and 
years of work experience are the most popular regressors in similar wage equations, often 
accompanied by their squared values.  
On the other hand, it has been recognized for a long time that some skills or human capital attributed 
to workers are also specific to the firm in which they work. The experience accumulated within the 
firm may be different from experience previously obtained outside the firm. Thus, part of the return to 
human capital for the worker remuneration can be viewed as if it originated from the firm.  
Moreover, the endogenous growth literature emphasizes the presence of technological or social 
externalities that generate higher returns to traditional factors, notably labour. It is likely that some of 
these externalities occur in the form of general knowledge that may be diffused in the economy or the 
considered activity sector. It is also probable that many externalities actually take place in the firm 
where the worker operates since that is where the technological processes are most frequently 
exhibited and transmitted.  
Thus, the overall return to human capital explaining the remuneration of a given worker may involve 
personal skill characteristics and firm knowledge characteristics. It seems important to consider these 
two sources of returns to human capital simultaneously because education policies and policies 
promoting vocational training may affect the worker’s and the firm’s human capital environment 
differently. In particular, assessing policies without accounting for educational and knowledge 
externalities within firms may under-estimate the benefits of such policies. 
Finally, distinguishing the two sources of human capital may contribute to explaining the typical over-
estimation of returns to schooling in LDCs, as mentioned in Behrman (1999), which occurs while 
neglecting intra-firm human capital externalities. Indeed, part of the impact of knowledge on 
productivities may be caused by these externalities, associated or not with specific firm processes and 
working rules. 
In this paper, we want to look at how return to human capital, and notably intra-firm human capital 
externalities, may arise in the developing economy of Tunisia. The case of Tunisia is interesting as a 
success story resulting from its relatively fast economic catching up with more developed countries. In 
this situation, firm and worker knowledge may have different rewards depending on the importance 
that is paid to human capital investments by the long run government strategies. Like its African 
neighbours, Tunisia cannot afford to neglect the role of human capital in the fight against poverty and 
in enhancing labour productivity. For instance, these issues are crucial in the light of the future 
creation of a free trade zone with the European Union. Henceforth, the improvement of human capital 
– notably by on-the-job training – constitutes a priority in any productivity progress and in raising the 
quality of exported products. 
Studying effects of various human capital dimensions on earnings may be easier in a LDC economy 
because its structures may change faster and generate larger endogenous growth than a fully developed 
economy. Then, we shall consider as a working hypothesis that when the human capital density in the 
firm is correlated with worker wages, holding worker’s characteristics constant, this mostly reflects 
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5 
intra-firm human capital externalities. This approach does not exclude other interpretations: selectivity 
or matching effects, economic rents correlated with human capital and other firm characteristics, as in 
Teal (1996), or unemployment shocks specific to the different human capital categories affecting 
specifically some industries, as in Hoddinott (1996). The tests of such interpretations are unfortunately 
beyond the possibilities of our data. 
Crucial data 
One popular way to account for firm characteristics, including for their human capital features, is to 
base the econometric investigation on matched worker-firm data4. Mostly, dummy variables for 
individual firms are added as independent variables in usual wage equations. We shall avail ourselves 
of such data, for the first time in the Tunisian case on which we focus. Then, this paper will tell us 
how returns to human capital in a LDC like Tunisia differ from the industrial countries usually studied 
with matched data. 
This data is crucial to understand inter-firm wage differentials. The persistence of wage differentials 
for individuals with identical productive characteristics is an important stylized fact. Indeed, wage 
differentials that are not compensated by observed individual characteristics were found on numerous 
occasions in empirical studies, depending on their industry or firm5. Many models attempted to give a 
theoretical interpretation of these inter-industry or inter-firm wage differentials: some of them stress 
non-competitive wage determination6. Other models, within the competitive framework, emphasize 
the existence of compensating wages due to, for instance, differences in jobs across industries 
(Murphy and Topel, 1987).  
Nevertheless, data used to study inter-firm wage differentials are scarce. The Tunisian data we use 
provide precise information both on employees and their firms. Therefore, using these data, we 
examine the firm’s effect on individual earnings, but also refine the fixed effect by investigating the 
human capital characteristics of each firm. 
Policy issues 
Poverty is a major subject of concern in Tunisia. The Tunisian Governments have been successful in 
reducing the extent of poverty since the independence7. Accordingly, poverty has just slightly 
increased from 1990 to 1995. So the global picture is that of a stabilization of poverty, although the 
poor are increasingly concentrated in peri-urban areas, particularly in Tunis8. This is where our survey 
took place.  
Several reforms of the labour market have been recently undertaken by the Tunisian government. 
First, the Labour Code was revised in 1994 and again in 1996 to clarify the conditions under which 
workers can be laid off and to establish guidelines for financial compensation. Second, Tunisian 
producers will face stronger competition in their export markets after the elimination of the Multi-
Fiber Arrangements (MFA) scheduled to be completed by 2005. Third, the competition will be fiercer 
in the local market with full implementation in 2007 of the Association Agreement signed with the EU 
in 1995, which allows free trade provisions. It is expected that better jobs for higher skilled workers 
will be generated and less skilled workers will encounter greater difficulties in finding and retaining 
jobs9 since Tunisia may find more profitable to shift towards industries with higher added values to the 
detriment of its traditional sectors. Then, the situation of low-wage workers is worrying in a context of 
increasing liberalization, economic opening and privatization. A response to policy and structural 
                                                     
4 Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999), Goux and Maurin (1999), Abowd, Kramarz, Margolis and Troske (2000). See Abowd and 
Kramarz (1999) for a survey. 
5 Krueger and Summers (1988), Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) and Goux and Maurin (1999). 
6 See Katz (1986) for a review of efficiency wage theories and Lindbeck and Snower (1989) for a review of the insider-outsider models.  
7 The World Bank (2000); UNDP Tunis (1994). 
8 Muller (2002). 
9 Measurement of unemployment in Tunisia is a difficult and contentious issue (Rama, 1998). However, unemployment is a growing 
concern of the population and government. 
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shocks may be found in the improvement of sector productivity, connected to average skill levels in 
Tunisia10. The Tunisian economy ability to restructure may thus be raised: by shedding labour and 
changing the skill mixes of its labour forces; by encouraging firms to invest in on-the-job training; and 
by consolidating Tunisia’s positive record in labour relations and working conditions. 
As a response to these economic transformations, Tunisia started a large modernization program of the 
productive sector in 1996. This program assists industrial and service firms in adjusting to a free 
market. Physical and non-physical firm investment is stimulated. Human capital investment will be 
crucial in this modernization process.  
Educational policies can reduce poverty by raising labour rewards for better-educated workers. In this 
situation, it is natural to examine the returns to education for different wage levels. If education returns 
are high for the poor, fighting poverty through schooling opportunities or vocational training is 
adequate. On the contrary if the educational investments mostly benefit the rich, then improving the 
educational system may lead to higher growth but also to higher inequality and unchanged poverty. 
Education reform is also instrumental in improving the education system responsiveness to emerging 
labour market demands. The Tunisian authorities are placing an increasing emphasis on vocational 
training, which fulfils the double objective of educating and preparing workers for a modern job 
market. Recently, the government has implemented a program to rehabilitate vocational training and 
employment (MANFORME, Mise à Niveau de la Formation Professionnelle et de l’Emploi). In the 
near future, the authorities should consider how to involve private employers in vocational training to 
match skills demand and supply.  
What are the human capital characteristics influencing Tunisian workers’ wages at different wage 
levels? The aim of this paper is to explore this question by first using matched worker-firm data, and 
second, summarizing the main characteristics of firms with a preliminary multivariate analysis. We 
show that, in such a case, the lack of matched worker-firm data could be compensated by some limited 
information on firms that is easily collected from workers. In Section 1, we present the data. We 
discuss estimation results for wage equations at different wage levels in Section 2. In this section, we 
also push the analysis one step further by incorporating firm characteristics and interpreting firm 
dummy effects using a factor analysis. Finally, the last section proposes some policy implications of 
our results. 
1. THE TUNISIAN MATCHED WORKER-FIRM DATA 
The matched worker-firm data we use are directly collected at the employee’s workplace11. The 
questionnaire provides precise information about each worker: individual characteristics (matrimonial 
status, number of dependent children, geographic origin, father’s education), wages, educational 
investments (number of years spent in primary, secondary, and high school, university or vocational 
school), post-school training (apprenticeships, preliminary internships, formal training within the 
current firm), total experience in the labour market and occupation in the current firm. Moreover, the 
data include characteristics of the firms in which workers evolve: organisational features, 
communication and training policies, innovation and competitive situations. 
                                                     
10 Belhareth and Hergli (2000). 
11 The methodology of the Tunisian survey appears in Nordman (2002a, 2002b) and Destré and Nordman (2002). The definitions and the 
descriptive statistics of the variables are in Tables 1 and 2. 
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1.1. The workers 
The 231 workers in the final sample were interviewed in February 1999. Table 1 provides some 
descriptive statistics about these workers, which are matched with a sample of eight firms (four firms 
in the textile-clothing sector and four in the Mechanics, Metallurgical, Electrical and Electronics 
Industries, IMMEE). 54.1 % of the employees work in the textile sector and 45.9 % in IMMEE. The 
proportion of women in the overall sample amounts to almost half, 49.8 %. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the workers’ characteristics 
 
Variables Mean 
Standard 
deviation min max 
Age of individuals (AGE) 29.532 7.774 15 52 
Sex (FEMALE, 1: woman; 0 man; conversely for MALE) 0.498 0.501 0 1 
Geographical origin (PROVE, 1: rural area; 0 otherwise) 0.147 0.355 0 1 
Matrimonial situation (MARI, 1: if married; 0 if divorced, widowed or single) 0.368 0.483 0 1 
Single male (CELIBAH, 1: yes; 0 otherwise) 0.303 0.460 0 1 
Number of dependant children (ENFT) 0.580 1.060 0 5 
Father has a level of Primary school (PPRIM, 1: yes; 0 otherwise) 0.173 0.379 0 1 
Father has a level of Secondary school (PSECON, 1: yes; 0 otherwise) 0.164 0.371 0 1 
Father has a level of Higher education (PSUP, 1: yes; 0 otherwise) 0.125 0.332 0 1 
Father is illiterate (PANAL, 1: yes; 0 otherwise) 0.194 0.396 0 1 
Years of schooling (EDUCATION) 9.676 3.880 0 18 
Previous apprenticeship in a firm (APPRENTI, 1: yes; 0 otherwise) 0.363 0.482 0 1 
Periods of internship related to the current job (STAGA, in months) 1.468 3.617 0.00 24.0 
Periods of internship not related to the current job (STAGAN, in months) 0.121 0.759 0.00 6.00 
     
Periods of unemployment (CHOMA, in years) 1.385 2.825 0.00 18.0 
Previous relevant experience (EMSIM,  1: yes; 0 otherwise) 0.554 0.498 0 1 
Previous total professional experience (EXPERIENCE, in years) 3.261 4.689 0 22 
Start date in the current firm (ENTREE)  1992.1 5.901 1968 1997
Tenure in the current firm (TENURE, in years) 5.898 5.902 0.17 30.08
Formal training received in the current firm (FORMAD, 1: yes; 0 otherwise) 0.182 0.387 0 1 
Formal training period in the current firm in years (FORMAA) 0.091 0.323 0 3 
Ongoing formal training in the current firm (FORSTIL, 1: yes; 0 otherwise) 0.017 0.130 0 1 
Member of an union (SYNDIC, 1: yes; 0 otherwise) 0.203 0.403 0 1 
Work in team (EQUIPE, 1: yes; 0 otherwise) 0.367 0.483 0 1 
Work in chain (CHAINE, 1: yes; 0 otherwise) 0.320 0.467 0 1 
Executive or supervisor (ENCADR, 1: yes; 0 otherwise) 0.190 0.394 0 1 
     
Hourly wage (salh, in dinars) 1.893 1.347 0.29 7.57 
Log of hourly wage (lnsalh) 0.197 0.251 -0.54 0.88 
Monthly wage (sal, in dinars) 315.131 231.382 52 1350 
     
Firms’ fixed effects     
Firm 1  0.134 0.342 0 1 
Firm 2 0.160 0.368 0 1 
Firm 3 0.143 0.351 0 1 
Firm 4 0.130 0.337 0 1 
Firm 5 0.130 0.337 0 1 
Firm 6 0.087 0.282 0 1 
Firm 7 0.078 0.269 0 1 
Firm 8 0.139 0.346 0 1 
The average educational year is 9.6 over the sample when calculated from the workers’ questionnaires, 
using the available information on the highest level of education reached by the workers. Educational 
years are slightly higher for men (10.6 years) than for women (8.7 years). For men, it corresponds to 
the first year of high school. In contrast, calculating it from the age at the end of school (from which 
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we deduct 6 years), the average number of schooling years is close to 13. Thus, accounting for 
unsuccessful years of education12, we choose to use an education variable net from repeated classes. 
Consequently, the years of schooling include an important qualitative aspect13. 0.8 % of the observed 
workers have never gone to school, 9.9 % have only completed a primary level of education 
(1 to 5 years), 71.8 % have obtained an educational level of 6 to 12 years (secondary school) and 
17.3 % have completed studies in higher education (university level). The proportion of employees 
having received a vocational diploma related to their current job amounts to 31.6 %. 
The average tenure in the current firm is 5.9 years. It amounts to 5 years for women, while it is higher 
for men (6.75 years). The total professional experience is an average of 9.1 years. On average, men 
cumulate more than 10 years of experience against less than 8 years for women. Besides, the previous 
experience apart from the current job is on average of 3.3 years. Women average 2.8 years, compared 
to 3.6 years for men. 
The ratio of tenure to the overall work experience is 64 %. This suggests an important percentage of 
young, first-time workers. Indeed, the average age in the sample is low, amounting to 29.5 years and 
28 and 31 years for women and men respectively.  
Some wage characteristics are worth noting. The average monthly wage declared by employees is 
213 US dollars14, while an average monthly wage for male workers is 1.7 times the female wage. 
Beyond differences in human capital endowments between sexes, the female proportion of the sample 
employed in the textiles, where wages are generally low, contributes to this wage differential: 94% of 
the observed women belong to the clothing sector, while male workers of this sector represent only 
14% of all male workers. Indeed, the average monthly wage in the IMMEE sector is 1.6 times higher 
than in the textile sector. Educational differences should partially explain this: On average, the 
IMMEE workers have 10.6 years of education compared to 8.9 years for those working in textiles.  
Statistics specific to each wage quartile show that workers’ characteristics differ according to wage 
level. Lower wage workers are less educated, trained and experienced. They are on average younger, 
mainly females and have suffered longer unemployment spells. These results suggest separate 
modelling of the wage rates at different wage levels. To simplify the presentation, we shall call ‘the 
poor’ the observed low wage workers, and ‘the rich’ the highly paid workers. Naturally, these notions 
of living standard level are restricted in this paper to wage workers in the formal sector and are not 
representative of all the poor in Tunisia15. We now turn to the firm characteristics. 
1.2. The firms 
The four firms of each sector are located in the Tunis area. They are selected based on criteria of size 
(not less than 50 employees), activity, vocation to export and capital ownership16. They all belong to 
the formal sector. This firm sample is interesting because these firms are typically in the range of 
shocks and policies we mentioned above. The average size of the establishments visited is 
130 employees.  
                                                     
12 For comparison, Angrist and Lavy (1997) estimate the number of repeated classes at 2 to 3 years in Morocco. Besides, UNDP (1994) 
shows that Tunisia in the 1980’s had a higher rate of repeated classes at the primary school than Morocco. 
13 See on this point Behrman and Birdsall (1983). 
14 The average monthly wage corresponds to 1.8 times the monthly SMIG of 1997 for a regime of 48 hours per week (177.8 Tunisian 
Dinars, that is 125 US dollars in 2001). The declared monthly wages are those of January and February 1999. 
15 Low (high) skilled workers do not systematically correspond to low (high) pay workers. Another approach could have been to oppose 
skill categories rather than wage levels. In this paper, we focus on wage categories to capture differential social consequences of training 
and education policies. 
16 The observed firms were selected among firms exporting their production and not with entirely foreign capital. 
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Information about the firm’s characteristics have been collected directly from the employers: 
composition of the workforce, work organization, training and communication policies, organizational 
or technical innovations and competitive situation of the firm. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics. 
Table 2 : Firms’ descriptive statistics 
 
Variables 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation min max 
Average education in the firm 10.07 2.546 7.7 15.4 
Average tenure in the firm 5.818 3.631 1.43 13.60 
Average total experience in the firm 9.002 3.869 3.61 16.9 
Average age of employees in the firm 29.717 2.880 26.19 34.55 
Work independence stimulated (1: yes; 0: no) 0.250 0.463 0 1 
Level of stimulated internal communication (1 to 3) 0.900 1.039 0 3 
Level of competition (1 to 5) 3.125 1.642 1 5 
Regular work control (1: yes; 0: no) 0.500 0.535 0 1 
Age of the firm  10.438 5.766 3.5 20 
Number of intermediary levels of management  5.000 0.535 4 7 
Size (number of employees) 131.250 100.954 70 371 
Existing system of formal training (1: yes; 0: no) 0.250 0.463 0 1 
Task definition (1: globally defined; 0: precisely defined) 0.250 0.463 0 1 
Organizational innovation the last four years (1: yes; 0: no) 0.5 0.534 0 1 
Technological innovation the last four years (1: yes; 0: no) 0.625 0.517 0 1 
% of exported production  0.603 0.462 0 1 
Exportation (1: yes; 0: no)  0.75 0.462 0 1 
System of versatility implemented (1: yes; 0: no) 0.625 0.518 0 1 
% of employees working in chain  0.358 0.409 0.00 0.91 
Sector  (1: textiles; 0: IMMEE) 0.500 0.535 0 1 
Rate of supervision 0.103 0.069 0.05 0.25 
Rate of management 0.146 0.278 0.02 0.83 
Figure 1 shows the histogram of observed wages. The two minimum wages are separately indicated by 
vertical lines for 40 hours a week and 48 hours a week. Contemporary wages are concentrated around 
values slightly above the minimum wage, while heavy right tails account for a small number of very 
skilled workers. We are now ready to discuss the estimation results. 
Figure 1: Distribution of observed monthly wages of all types of workers 
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2. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
2.1. The model and the estimation method 
The matched worker-firm data enables us to estimate the returns to human capital using both workers’ 
and their firms’ information. For this purpose, the Mincer earnings function is a convenient tool for 
estimating the average returns to education and labour market experience. The return to education is 
given by the coefficient of schooling duration in the wage equation17. However, returns to human 
capital can vary across wage categories. For instance, high wage workers should not benefit from the 
same return to experience than low wage workers since the latter may have fewer incentives to make 
further on-the-job investment in human capital because they only deal with basic tasks. Alternatively, 
more educated individuals – generally with higher wages – may have greater incentive to invest in 
training because they learn more quickly. As a result, the shape of the relationship between the 
workers’ wage level and their returns to education and work experience (former experience plus tenure 
in the incumbent firm) is not clear. To capture differentiated returns of education and experience 
between the rich and the poor, we construct four individual dummies indicating the workers’ relative 
position in the sample in terms of hourly wage (quartile 1 to quartile 4). These dummies 
(QUARTILEi, i: 1…4) are allowed to interact with the main three human capital variables in the wage 
equation: education, tenure and previous work experience.  
As alluded to in the introduction, the lack of suitable matched firm-employee data for the wage 
analysis has been deplored by a number of authors, such as Rosen (1986) and Willis (1986), as such 
data allows the structure of wages to be modelled while controlling firm-specific effects. With our 
matched data, we can deal with the firm heterogeneity by introducing firm dummy variables into the 
wage equation. However, since we have cross-sectional data, we cannot model unobserved individual 
heterogeneity in the way of Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999). To temper the effects of 
unobserved individual heterogeneity which might bias the estimated coefficients, we add control 
variables to our OLS regressions and perform instrumented regressions (2SLS).  
Naturally, using firm dummies is a rough way of accounting for intra-firm human capital externalities. 
Meanwhile, it is possible that part of what could be interpreted as human capital externalities in the 
estimates is in fact a consequence of the worker selection by firms and vice versa. For example, very 
productive firms and workers may choose each other. In this paper, because of data limitations, we do 
not deal with this difficulty, and we assume that selectivity and sub-sampling effects can be neglected. 
In the wage equations, we incorporate formal training received in the current firm (ongoing training 
and past training). In our sample, more educated workers generally receive more formal training: on 
average 12.2 years of schooling for workers having received formal training compared to 9.1 for the 
others.  
Two other dummy variables are retained in the regressions18. One dummy variable controls for the 
worker’s hierarchical position in the firm (executive or supervisor), while the other describes trade 
union membership. Workers who are executive or supervisor are expected to have higher earnings. 
The effect of union membership on wages remains unclear in the empirical literature.  
We do not limit our analysis to the OLS results or 2SLS estimations. Introducing dummies for 
quartiles in the regressors creates endogeneity problems that may be imperfectly corrected with 
instrumental variable methods. A way to avoid this difficulty is by using quantile regressions. Quantile 
regression estimators have recently become popular estimation methods (Koenker and Bassett, 1978), 
which have been employed for wage analyses (Buchinsky, 1998, 2001). The popularity of these 
methods relies on two sets of properties. First, they provide robust estimates, particularly for 
misspecification errors related to non-normality and heteroscedasticity, but also for the presence of 
                                                     
17 Quadratic and more flexible polynomial specifications have been tried but cannot be accurately estimated with these data. 
18 All the other socio-economic variables such as sex, matrimonial status and geographic origin are dropped from the regressions for lack of 
significance and to preserve degrees of freedom.  
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outliers, often due to data contamination. Second, they allow the researcher to concentrate her 
attention on specific parts of the distribution of interest. This is the case when the distribution of 
interest is the conditional distribution of the dependent variable. 
Consequently, focusing on the quantiles of error terms in wage equations, introduces an alternative 
notion of wage precariousness that can be contrasted with the quantiles of the wage distribution. One 
can oppose the low observed level of wages in OLS and 2SLS estimates with the low conditional 
wage level in the quantile regression estimates. We choose to pursue these two approaches. We find 
that the residuals’ quantiles from the regressions are correlated to those obtained when different 
quartiles are used to define the quantile regression. In contrast, they are not as strongly correlated to 
the quartiles of the wages themselves. Thus, low quantiles corresponding to the two approaches 
capture distinct dimensions of wage precariousness.  
Finally, bootstrap confidence intervals are used for quantile regressions in order to avoid the 
consequences of the slow convergence of classical confidence intervals of estimates (Hahn, 1995). Let 
us examine the estimates. 
2.2. The wage equation estimates 
Our first estimates of the equations of the logarithm of individual hourly wage are reported in Table 3. 
The first two columns correspond to OLS estimates without wage quartiles as regressors. The 
following two columns show the results obtained when the returns to human capital can vary across 
wage quartiles through the inclusion of dummy variables for wage quartiles19. 
The wage equation which incorporates firm’s fixed effect is characterized by a better goodness-of-fit 
than the standard Mincerian wage function20. As noticed by Abowd and Kramarz (1999), the return to 
schooling decreases after controlling for firms’ heterogeneity with fixed effects. In OLS regressions, 
the marginal return to education in Tunisia is 6.9% with the firm’s fixed effects instead of 8.6% 
without the firm dummies. With comparable equations and French data (1992 ECMOSS survey), we 
find a drop from 5.73 to 4.91%. The drop for Tunisia is in the scope of usual results (Abowd and 
Kramarz, 1999).  Thus, introducing firm dummies brings to the fore a partial answer to the issue of 
typical over-estimation of education returns in LDCs. To our knowledge, no comparable estimates 
exist on Tunisia21.  
High returns to education in Tunisia in 1999 may be explained by stylized facts of the labour market. 
The picture that emerges from Rama's study (1998) is one of an increasingly tight labour market. His 
critical evaluation of the methods used to forecast unemployment rates and an econometric analysis of 
the data on vacancies and unemployment suggests a relatively efficient labour market. For instance, 
Tunisia’s unemployment problem appears to have been greatly overstated. More specifically, the use 
of comparable labour force definitions shows that unemployment has declined quite steadily over the 
years, which is not surprising given the remarkable performance of the Tunisian economy. In this 
context, increasing opportunity costs and therefore possible high reservation wage for young educated 
workers might lead to high returns to education in 1999. However, the following estimates will show 
that an alternative interpretation of these high returns is that they result from misspecifications related 
to differential results across wage levels. 
                                                     
19 We also test interactions of these dummies with the quadratic terms of experience variable to take into account possible differentiated 
decreasing returns to experience across wage quartiles. However, since the results were little significant, we choose to exclude these 
interactions to preserve on degrees of freedom.  
20 The Fisher test of the constrained model (without the firm’s fixed effect) against the unconstrained model (fixed effects) shows that we 
cannot reject the unconstrained model at the 1% level.  
21 See Psacharopoulos (1985, 1994, 2002) for surveys reporting the returns to education in numerous countries. Some of the education effect 
may be caused by selection. Firm dummies may help control for the selection effects, but other individual and household characteristics 
are missing which does not allow us to be fully protected against a selectivity bias.  
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Table 3: Wage equations 
Dependent variable: Log hourly wage (lnsalh) 
 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS IV  (2SLS) 
Quantile regressions 
(bootstrap standard error: 20 iterations) 
Firm fixed effects models 
Explanatory variables 
 
 
(1) 
Firm fixed effects 
model 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
Firm fixed effects 
model 
(4) 
Firm fixed effects 
model 
(5) 
0.25 
Quantile 
(6) 
0.50 
Quantile 
(7) 
0.75 
Quantile 
(8) 
Constant -0.7324*** (0.0864) 0.00
0.0090 
(0.1275) 0.94
-0.1616 
(0.2186) 0.46
-0.0459 
(0.2093) 0.82
-0.1034 
(0.4177) 0.81
0.2098 
(0.3110) 0.50
0.5531** 
(0.2798) 0.04
0.2570 
(0.2652) 0.33
Education 0.0861*** (0.0071) 0.00 
0.0691*** 
(0.0068) 0.00
0.0857*** 
(0.0103) 0.00
0.0870*** 
(0.0124) 0.00
0.0915*** 
(0.0248) 0.00
0.0498*** 
(0.0114) 0.00
0.0448*** 
(0.0156) 0.00
0.0686*** 
(0.0157) 0.00
QUARTILE1 _  _  -0.5933** (0.2369) 0.01
-0.3702 
(0.2271) 0.10
-0.4284 
(0.4424) 0.33 _  _  _  
QUARTILE2 _  _  0.2733 (0.2365) 0.25
0.5047** 
(0.2268) 0.02
1.0567* 
(0.5536) 0.06 _  _  _  
QUARTILE3 _  _  0.6223*** (0.2353) 0.01
0.7992*** 
(0.2253) 0.00
0.7524 
(0.4845) 0.12 _  _  _  
Education*QUARTILE1 _  _  -0.0433*** (0.0159) 0.01
-0.0464*** 
(0.0152) 0.00
-0.0596* 
(0.0335) 0.08 _  _  _  
Education*QUARTILE2 _  _  -0.0809*** (0.0154) 0.00
-0.0839*** 
(0.0146) 0.00
-0.1286*** 
(0.0363) 0.00 _  _  _  
Education*QUARTILE3 _  _  -0.0814*** (0.0147) 0.00
-0.0848*** 
(0.0139) 0.00
-0.0806*** 
(0.0293) 0.01 _  _  _  
Tenure 0.0255** (0.0107) 0.02 
0.0452*** 
(0.0099) 0.00
-0.0071 
(0.0085) 0.41
0.0099 
(0.0087) 0.25
0.0107 
(0.0160) 0.50
0.0448** 
(0.0233) 0.05
0.0271** 
(0.0141) 0.05
0.0362*** 
(0.0122) 0.00
Tenure2 -0.0004 (0.0005) 0.43 
-0.0012*** 
(0.0004) 0.01
0.0006** 
(0.0003) 0.05
0.0002 
(0.0003) 0.54
0.0002 
(0.0005) 0.76
-0.0009 
(0.0009) 0.33
-0.0006 
(0.0006) 0.34
-0.0008* 
(0.0005) 0.10
Tenure*QUARTILE1 _  _  0.0699*** (0.0128) 0.00
0.0621*** 
(0.0130) 0.00
0.0755** 
(0.0339) 0.03 _  _  _  
Tenure*QUARTILE2 _  _  0.0022 (0.0091) 0.81
-0.0094 
(0.0090) 0.29
-0.0362 
(0.0276) 0.19 _  _  _  
Tenure*QUARTILE3 _  _  -0.0015 (0.0062) 0.81
-0.0091 
(0.0062) 0.14
-0.0085 
(0.0135) 0.53 _  _  _  
Experience 0.0325*** (0.0127) 0.01 
0.0426*** 
(0.0117) 0.00
0.0373*** 
(0.0103) 0.00
0.0495*** 
(0.0102) 0.00
0.0426*** 
(0.0171) 0.01
0.0467** 
(0.0233) 0.04
0.0306** 
(0.0148) 0.04
0.0322** 
(0.0166) 0.05
Experience2 -0.0004 (0.0007) 0.57 
-0.0011* 
(0.0006) 
0.10 -0.0006 
(0.0004) 0.20
-0.0009** 
(0.0004) 0.03
-0.0005 
(0.0006) 0.40
-0.0015 
(0.0016) 0.33
-0.0010 
(0.0008) 0.24
-0.0002 
(0.0012) 0.87
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Table 3: Wage equations (continued) 
 
Experience*QUARTILE1 _  _  0.0057 (0.0130) 0.66
-0.0022 
(0.0127) 0.86
0.0274 
(0.0344) 0.43 _  _  _  
Experience*QUARTILE2 _  _  -0.0290*** (0.0083) 0.00
-0.0345*** 
(0.0079) 0.00
-0.0512*** 
(0.0168) 0.00 _  _  _  
Experience*QUARTILE3 _  _  -0.0270*** (0.0082) 0.00
-0.0347*** 
(0.0079) 0.00
-0.0324** 
(0.0150) 0.03 _  _  _  
Ongoing formal training -0.4972*** (0.1798) 0.00 
-0.4159*** 
(0.1577) 0.01
-0.1542 
(0.1001) 0.13
-0.1288 
(0.0948) 0.17
-0.0821 
(0.1211) 0.50
-0.3502 
(0.2522) 0.16
-0.4649** 
(0.2236) 0.04
-0.3384 
(0.2501) 0.17
Completed formal training 0.4885*** (0.0660) 0.00 
0.2710*** 
(0.0735) 0.00
0.2103*** 
(0.0384) 0.00
0.1313*** 
(0.0445) 0.00
0.1107** 
(0.0547) 0.04
0.3275** 
(0.1433) 0.02
0.2270** 
(0.0961) 0.02
0.1853* 
(0.1007) 0.06
Union -0.0835 (0.0649) 0.19 
0.0012 
(0.0619) 0.99
-0.0715* 
(0.0403) 0.08
-0.0573 
(0.0401) 0.15
-0.0434 
(0.0559) 0.44
-0.0030 
(0.1023) 0.97
0.0884 
(0.0696) 0.20
0.0373 
(0.1113) 0.73
Executive or supervisor 0.2124*** (0.0698) 0.00 
0.2655*** 
(0.0618) 0.00
0.0940** 
(0.0395) 0.02
0.1272*** 
(0.0384) 0.00
0.1264*** 
(0.0480) 0.01
0.1941** 
(0.0824) 0.02
0.3436*** 
(0.0764) 0.00
0.2889*** 
(0.0861) 0.00
Firm1 _  -0.5318*** (0.1041) 0.00
_  -0.2797*** (0.0679) 0.00
-0.2460*** 
(0.0890) 0.01
-0.7944*** 
(0.2545) 0.00
-0.8185*** 
(0.1240) 0.00
-0.6331*** 
(0.2587) 0.01
Firm2 _  -0.4824*** (0.1019) 0.00
_  -0.3066*** (0.0651) 0.00
-0.2877*** 
(0.0865) 0.00
-0.6706*** 
(0.2293) 0.00
-0.7262*** 
(0.1503) 0.00
-0.5229*** 
(0.1752) 0.00
Firm3 _  -0.7895*** (0.1033) 0.00
_  -0.3567*** (0.0680) 0.00
-0.3002*** 
(0.0904) 0.00
-0.9655*** 
(0.2586) 0.00
-1.0392*** 
(0.1550) 0.00
-0.8133*** 
(0.1766) 0.00
Firm4 _  -0.7425*** (0.1082) 0.00
_  -0.3745*** (0.0716) 0.00
-0.3208*** 
(0.1012) 0.00
-0.9637*** 
(0.2648) 0.00
-0.9987*** 
(0.1995) 0.00
-0.8391*** 
(0.1962) 0.00
Firm5 _  -0.7227*** (0.1055) 0.00
_  -0.4016*** (0.0682) 0.00
-0.3643*** 
(0.0953) 0.00
-0.9420*** 
(0.2426) 0.00
-0.9317*** 
(0.1855) 0.00
-0.7328*** 
(0.1602) 0.00
Firm7 _  -0.6098*** (0.1036) 0.00
_  -0.3015*** (0.0701) 0.00
-0.2852*** 
(0.0946) 0.00
-0.7814*** 
(0.2368) 0.00
-0.6602*** 
(0.1522) 0.00
-0.6072*** 
(0.1134) 0.00
Firm8 _  -0.7736*** (0.1007) 0.00
_  -0.3297*** (0.0667) 0.00
-0.2473*** 
(0.0909) 0.01
-0.9083*** 
(0.2455) 0.00
-0.9900*** 
(0.1611) 0.00
-0.7999*** 
(0.1902) 0.00
R2 0.67 0.76 0.91 0.92 0.905 
Pseudo R2 
0.43 
Pseudo R2 
0.54 
Pseudo R2 
0.61 
Observations 231 231 231 231 231 231 231 231 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. P-values appear in italic. ***, ** and * mean respectively significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
The instrumented variables in the IV regression (5) are: Education QUARTILE 1 QUARTILE 2 QUARTILE 3 Education*QUARTILE 1 Education*QUARTILE 2 Education*QUARTILE 3 Tenure*QUARTILE 1 
Tenure*QUARTILE 2 Tenure*QUARTILE 3 Experience*QUARTILE 1 Experience*QUARTILE 2 Experience*QUARTILE 3 
The additional instruments used in the IV regression (besides the exogenous variables of equation 5) include: age, (age)2, apprenti, celibah, chaine, choma, (choma)2, choma*female, emsim, enft, (enft)2, log(enft), enft*age, 
entree, equipe, formaa, (formaa)2, (formaa)3, formaa*female, forstil*female, mari*female, mari*female, mari*male, panal, panal*age, panal*choma, panal*enft, panal*formaa, pprim, pprim*age, pprim*choma, pprim*enft, 
pprim*formaa, prove, psecon, psecon*age, psecon*choma, psecon*enft, psecon*formaa, psup, psup*age, psup*choma, psup*enft, psup*formaa, staga, (staga)2, (staga)3, stagan, (stagan)2, (stagan)3.  
The definitions of the variables and instruments appear in Table 1. 
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Columns (3) and (4) elicit returns to human capital that are significantly different across wage 
quartiles, without and with adding the firm’s fixed effect, respectively. Table 4 summarizes the main 
results of all these estimators by computing the coefficients of education, job tenure and previous 
experience for each wage quartile. Looking at OLS estimates show that the poorest workers (first 
quartile) have significantly higher returns to human capital than the workers belonging to the middle 
of the wage distribution: The returns to education amount to 4%, 0.3% and 0.2% for the workers 
belonging to the first, second and third quartiles, respectively. However, the return to schooling of the 
poorest workers is significantly lower than that of the richest workers (8.7% for the fourth quartile). 
More generally, except for tenure, the results emphasize a U curve that describes the returns to human 
capital (education and experience) as a function of the wage levels (first to fourth quartile). This is 
consistent with results found from quantile regression estimates in industrial countries, where returns 
to schooling are higher for the more skilled individuals (Martins and Pereira, 2004). As for tenure, its 
return is always significantly higher for the poorest employees than for the other categories, while the 
U curve corresponding to the estimates of coefficients is generally not significant22.  
Note that there is no mistake with the average education return dropping from 6.9% to 3.3%.  This 
result is confirmed by running separate regressions for each quartile and suggests that unconstrained 
education returns may be strongly biased. Moreover, the returns at the average point of the sample 
vary also a lot for experience (4.26% without quartile dummies against 2.56% with quartile dummies) 
and for tenure (respectively 4.51% and 2.31%). 
We control for the possible endogeneity of the education variable by using two-stage least square 
regression (2SLS) whose estimates are shown in column (5). Moreover, the introduction of the 
dummies for wage quartiles creates an additional source of endogeneity that must be dealt with. The 
set of instrument for both education and the wage quartiles is reported at the bottom of Table 123. An 
important instrument for the worker’s education variable is the education level of the worker's father24. 
The main results remain unchanged (Table 4). However, the returns to human capital are refined: the 
average return to education decreases from 3.3% (OLS) to 2.4% (2SLS)25. This return falls for the 
poorest workers and rises for the richest. The returns to tenure and experience are also enhanced for 
the poorest workers.  
We also investigate whether returns to human capital differ across the wage distribution by using 
quantile regressions for quantiles 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75. These estimates are shown in columns (6), (7) 
and (8) of Table 3. The results confirm a presence of gaps across the quartiles in the returns to 
education, tenure and previous experience (Table 4). Both returns to tenure and experience remain 
higher for workers belonging to the first quartile than the second and third quartiles. This is in contrast 
to different findings from Portugal in Machado and Mata (2001), where all aspects of human capital 
are relatively more valued only for high paying jobs. However, the last quartile corresponds to the 
highest returns to education. Meanwhile, the differences across the workers’ categories are smaller 
than those for the OLS and 2SLS.  
                                                     
22 One could raise an objection based on the shape of the histogram of wages: there may be only few observations between mode and 
extreme observations. Then, the U curve may result from too little information in the data for the second and third quartiles. Drawing the 
quartile lines of this histogram has shown us that this is not the case and that the low density levels occur only from the last quartile. 
23 The values of the F-statistics and R2 in instrumental equations ensure that we are not in the weak instrument case (Abadie et al., 2002). 
We attempted to instrument the experience variable as well, although this did not yield any good result since we lack additional 
instrumental variables to perform it in good conditions. 
24 This instrument, popular when using developing country data, may capture various genetic and environment influences (Sahn and 
Alderman, 1988). 
25 This is at odds with the effects of instrumental variables in some empirical works. For example, Card (1999) finds that for U.S. data, 
2SLS estimates on returns to education are often 15% higher than OLS estimates.  
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Table 4: Returns to human capital and wage effects of factors on quartiles 
 
 OLS 2SLS Quantile regressions 
 Quartiles Quartiles  
 1st 2nd 3rd 4th meanb 1st 2nd 3rd 4th meanb 0.25 Quantile 
0.50 
Quantile 
0.75 
Quantile 
Independent 
variables Firm fixed effects models           
Education 0.0405 0.0031 0.0022 0.0870 0.0330 0.0318 -0.0371 0.0108 0.0915 0.0240 0.0498 0.0448 0.0686 
Tenurea 0.0621 0.0027ns 0.0031ns 0.0121ns 0.0231 0.0755 -0.0237ns 0.0040ns 0.0125ns 0.0203 0.0448 0.0271 0.0266 
Experiencea 0.0414 0.0091 0.0088 0.0435 0.0256 0.0700 -0.0087 0.0102 0.0426 0.0285 0.0467 0.0306 0.0322 
 Factors effects models           
Factor 1 0.0205 -0.0131 nd -0.0128 nd -0.0175 -0.0166 -0.0363 ns 0.0285 ns 0.0001 ns 0.0127 ns -0.0049 ns -0.0544 -0.0561 -0.0360 
Factor 2 -0.0935 -0.0014 nd 0.0114 0.0506 0.0392 0.3382 nd -0.3171 0.0206 nd 0.0318 0.0324 0.1026 0.1020 0.0764 
Factor 3 0.0112 -0.0190 -0.0134 0.0295 -0.0014 ns -0.0296 nd 0.0179 nd -0.0347 0.0774 0.0050  -0.0121 ns -0.0099 ns -0.0113 ns 
 a : returns calculated at the average point of the sub-sample. b : mean of the effects for the different quartiles. ns : no significantly different from zero at 10% level.  
nd : no significantly different from the coefficient of the 4th quartile at 10% level.  
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Let us now look at the other estimated coefficients. Completed formal training plays an important role 
in explaining wage differentials (its coefficient is always significant at a 5% level and positive). This 
is consistent with theories that argue that wage differentials should reflect differences in training 
investment. On the other hand, the negative coefficient of the ongoing formal training variable, 
although not always significant, is consistent with Becker’s (1975) prediction that the costs of general 
training are shared between employers and employees (also found in Lynch, 1992; Barron et al., 1998; 
Parent, 1999). If this formal training is of general content, then the workers should partly compensate 
for it by accepting a lower wage during the training period (Leighton and Mincer, 1981; Hashimoto, 
1982). Since the evidence for such effect consistent with the human capital theory is often ambiguous 
in US data, it is useful to obtain some evidence from Tunisian data. As shown by the estimates, they 
ultimately benefit from this training which provides them with a positive wage premium (from 10% to 
30% increase depending on the regression) when training is completed. 
Finally, the estimates of the firm dummies’ coefficients are large and significant at the 1% 
level. This is in accordance with the usual wage differentials across individuals with identical 
productive characteristics in empirical studies26. Such wage differentials have been found in 
Tunisia in non-matched data (Abdennadher et al., 1994). The results show that workers with 
comparable measured characteristics earn different wages partly because they belong to 
different firms. In this study, wage differentials across firms will receive further consideration 
in the next sub-section where the firm effect on individual earnings is interpreted in terms of 
each company’s organisational features. 
2.3. Principal component analysis of the firm’s characteristics 
We use a principal component analysis (PCA) to summarize the information about the surveyed 
firms27. This method is based on the calculation of the inertia axes for a cloud of points that represents 
the data in table format. There are three possible uses of factor analysis in this context. First, and 
foremost, factor analyses are generally used to elicit hidden characteristics correlated with observable 
characteristics. Accordingly, we look for hidden characteristics which could replace the firm dummies. 
Second, we use the PCA results as a guide to replace these hidden firm characteristics with observable 
characteristics correlated with the main factors. Thus, we shall propose ‘pseudo-factor’ models where 
firm dummies are replace by a few observable firm characteristics. Third, we use the PCA as a 
substitute for regressions of firm dummies. Indeed, with only eight firms there is no hope for 
explaining firm effects with regression analysis. In contrast, the PCA allows us to investigate the 
determinants of the firm effects in our data. 
For our purpose, the first three estimated factors concentrate most of the relevant information 
about the firm’s characteristics. In a sense, we generalize the approach by Cardoso (1998) 
who regresses the firms’ fixed effects on different variables. 
Table 5 shows the results of the principal component analysis, with the definition of the main three 
inertia axes (the factors), which are linear components of the firm’s characteristics used for the 
analysis. The other factors represent a negligible amount of statistical information and are dropped 
from the analysis. In our basic specification without quartile dummies, OLS estimates without the 
firm’s dummies nor factors explain 67% of the log-wages variance. Adding our three factors raises 
this proportion by 8%, and the firm’s dummies instead by 9% only. The correlation coefficients of 
these characteristics with the first three factors are indicated for the interpretation. Clearly, the first 
factor corresponds to the activity sector (textile against IMMEE), grouping the firms most oriented 
towards exports28. The second factor describes the ‘density in the firm’ of the human capital 
characteristics. The third factor is closely associated with the firm’s modern features. Naturally, as is 
always the case in factor analysis, these interpretations are somehow subjective. The reader may 
substitutes her own if wished. 
                                                     
26 See Krueger and Summers (1988), Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) and Goux and Maurin (1999). 
27 In principal component analysis, a set of variables is transformed into orthogonal components, which are linear combinations of the 
variables and have maximum variance subject to being uncorrelated with one another. Typically, the first few components account for a 
large proportion of the total variance of the original variables, and hence can be used to summarize the original data. We tried many other 
techniques of factor analysis. They lead to similar conclusions. We omit them in the presentation to save space. 
28 The export orientation of the firm could be more relevant than the sector to characterise the first factor. However, the impact of the sector 
on wages seems to make more sense given the strong sector segmentation of the market in Tunisia. Indeed, every three years collective 
wage bargaining at sector level are conducted for 45 sectors. 
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Table 5: Principal component analysis 
 
Firm characteristics Vectors   Correlations 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Average human capital of employees in the firm        
Average age  -0.269 -0.075 0.006  -0.75* -0.20 0.01 
Average education  -0.079 0.319 -0.196  -0.22 0.86* -0.33 
Average tenure  -0.226 -0.205 0.049  -0.63* -0.55 0.08 
Average total experience  -0.219 -0.237 0.133  -0.61 -0.64* 0.23 
Variance of education  0.012 -0.268 0.091  0.03 -0.73* 0.15 
Variance of tenure  -0.278 -0.196 -0.049  -0.78* -0.53 -0.08 
Variance of total experience  -0.316 -0.140 -0.110  -0.88* -0.38 -0.19 
General characteristics of the firm        
Sector  (1: textiles; 0: IMMEE) 0.319 -0.107 0.112  0.89* -0.29 0.19 
Size (number of employees) 0.219 -0.054 -0.144  0.61 -0.14 -0.24 
Exportation (1: yes; 0: no)  0.254 0.152 -0.156  0.71* 0.41 -0.26 
Percentage of exported production  0.331 0.041 0.082  0.93* 0.11 0.14 
Level of competition (1 to 5) 0.302 -0.141 -0.128  0.85* -0.38 -0.22 
Firm age  0.062 -0.074 -0.554  0.17 -0.20 -0.95* 
Rate of supervision -0.165 0.319 -0.058  -0.46 0.86* -0.10 
Rate of management -0.051 0.355 0.061  -0.14 0.96* 0.10 
Number of intermediary levels of management  -0.025 -0.303 -0.086  -0.07 -0.82* -0.15 
Existing system of formal training (1: yes; 0: no) -0.225 0.198 0.255  -0.63* 0.54 0.44 
Organisational innovation the last four years (1: yes; 0: no) 0.049 0.085 0.332  -0.08 0.39 0.71* 
Technological innovation the last four years (1: yes; 0: no) -0.029 0.143 0.415  0.14 0.23 0.57 
Level of stimulated internal communication (1 to 3) -0.128 0.267 -0.157  -0.36 0.72* -0.27 
Characteristics of employees’ tasks        
Work independence stimulated (1: yes; 0: no) 0.076 0.233 -0.097  0.21 0.63* -0.17 
Frequent work control (1: yes; 0: no) 0.039 0.177 -0.194  0.11 0.48 -0.33 
Versatility system implemented (1: yes; 0: no) 0.156 0.100 0.234  0.44 0.27 0.40 
Percentage of employees working in chain  0.293 -0.097 0.205  0.82* -0.26 0.35 
Task definition (1: globally defined; 0: precisely defined) -0.088 0.195 -0.010  -0.25 0.53 -0.02 
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Table 6 indicates the correlation coefficients of the first three factors with the firm dummies on one 
hand, and a few education and gender characteristics of workers in the firm on the other hand. They 
confirm common wisdom about how the firm is characterized by each factor. Firms in the textile 
sector have a higher proportion of female workers and less educated or trained workers. Firms with 
high human capital density exhibit higher average education levels. Modern firms invest more in 
formal training. 
Table 6: Correlations between factors, firm fixed effects and characteristics of education in 
the firms 
 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
 
Firms’ fixed effects    
Firm 1 -0.72* -0.26 0.47 
Firm 2 -0.21 -0.27 -0.12 
Firm 3 0.38 -0.04 0.47 
Firm 4 0.32 -0.07 0.03 
Firm 5 0.26 -0.18 0.10 
Firm 6 -0.11 0.96* 0.10 
Firm 7 -0.31 0.01 -0.74* 
Firm 8 0.38 -0.14 -0.32 
 
Average education in the firm    
Average years of secondary school -0.12 0.87* -0.21 
Proportion of university diploma -0.24 0.94* -0.09 
Average amount of formal training -0.78* -0.06 0.43 
    
Proportion of females  0.91* -0.21 0.19 
*: significant at the 10% level. 
2.4. Wage equations with firm factors 
The factor analysis enables us to summarize the main information on the firms' characteristics into 
three principal components (factors)29. By contrast with the firms’ fixed effects introduced in the wage 
regressions in Table 3, the three factors suggest qualitative characteristics of the firms. In Table 7, we 
present the estimates of the wage equations in which the firm fixed effects are replaced by the three 
factors. 
                                                     
29 Various studies tried to separate the external effects of the group or the sector in which the workers evolve from the purely individual 
effects on their earnings differentials. Mean variables were added in earnings functions, after a control for the individual characteristics, 
by Dickens and Katz (1987), Krueger and Summers (1988), Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), Chennouf, Lévy-Garboua and 
Montmarquette (1997) and Kölling, Schnabel and Wagner (2002). Using factors is a further step in this direction. 
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Table 7: Wage equations with factors 
Dependent variable: Log hourly wage (lnsalh) 
 
 OLS OLS IV  (2SLS) OLS 
Quantile regressions 
(bootstrap standard errors: 20 iterations) 
Factor effects models 
Explanatory variables Factor effects model(1) 
Factor effects model
(2) 
Factor effects model
(3) 
Pseudo factors model
(4) 
0.25 
Quantile 
(5) 
0.50 
Quantile 
(6) 
0.75 
Quantile 
(7) 
Constant -0.2646 (0.2080) 0.205 
-0.4134** 
(0.2097) 0.050 
-0.0103 
(0.2097) 0.976 
-0.8529*** 
(0.1396) 
 
0.000
-0.5536*** 
(0.2122) 0.010
-0.3307*** 
(0.1112) 0.003
-0.3844** 
(0.1540) 0.013 
Education 0.0843*** (0.0123) 0.000 
0.0906*** 
(0.0124) 0.000 
0.0719*** 
(0.0208) 0.001 
0.0679*** 
 (0.0069) 0.000
0.0552*** 
(0.0128) 0.000
0.0570*** 
(0.0116) 0.000
0.0768*** 
(0.0121) 0.000 
QUARTILE1 -0.4394** (0.2247) 0.052 
-0.4562** 
(0.2384) 0.057 
-0.2405 
(0.3915) 0.540 _ 
 _  _  _  
QUARTILE2 0.4424** (0.2253) 0.051 
0.5391** 
(0.2413) 0.027 
-0.3072 
(0.4451) 0.491 _ 
 _  _  _  
QUARTILE3 0.7727*** (0.2254) 0.001 
0.8522*** 
(0.2303) 0.000 
0.4892 
(0.3559) 0.171 _ 
 _  _  _  
Education*QUARTILE1 -0.0416*** (0.0150) 0.006 
-0.0487*** 
(0.0154) 0.002 
-0.0302 
(0.0319) 0.345 _ 
 _  _  _  
Education*QUARTILE2 -0.0803*** (0.0145) 0.000 
-0.0860*** 
(0.0145) 0.000 
-0.0811*** 
(0.0305) 0.008 _ 
 _  _  _  
Education*QUARTILE3 -0.0863*** (0.0139) 0.000 
-0.0886*** 
(0.0145) 0.000 
-0.0745*** 
(0.0264) 0.005 _ 
 _  _  _  
Tenure 0.0066 (0.0085) 0.438 
0.0133 
(0.0087) 0.127 
0.0133* 
(0.0087) 0.062 
0.0432*** 
(0.0098) 0.00 
0.0442** 
(0.0229) 0.054
0.0303** 
(0.0129) 0.019
0.0213 
(0.0154) 0.168 
Tenure2 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 0.388 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 0.579 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 0.833 
-0.0012*** 
(0.0005) 0.007
-0.0010 
(0.0009) 0.310
-0.0007 
(0.0006) 0.243
-0.0002 
(0.0006) 0.725 
Tenure*QUARTILE1 0.0599*** (0.0125) 0.000 
0.0549*** 
(0.0133) 0.000 
_  _  _  _  _  
Tenure*QUARTILE2 -0.0079 (0.0089) 0.376 
-0.0144 
(0.0092) 0.120 
_  _  _  _  _  
Tenure*QUARTILE3 -0.0079 (0.0061) 0.199 
-0.0120* 
(0.0065) 0.067 
_  _  _  _  _  
Experience 0.0431*** (0.0098) 0.000 
0.0427*** 
(0.0097) 0.000 
0.0268** 
(0.0113) 0.019 
0.0375***
 (0.0114) 0.001
0.0494*** 
(0.0146) 0.001
0.0304** 
(0.0140) 0.031
0.0336** 
(0.0155) 0.032 
Experience2 
-0.0007* 
(0.0004) 0.083 
-0.0005 
(0.0004) 0.229 
-0.0007 
(0.0006) 0.220 
-0.0008 
(0.0006) 0.231 -0.0026** (0.0011) 0.020
-0.0003 
(0.0011) 0.769
0.0001 
(0.0011) 0.895 
Experience*QUARTILE1 0.0003 (0.0124) 0.983 
0.0014 
(0.0127) 0.911 
_  _  _  _  _  
Experience*QUARTILE2 -0.0341*** (0.0079) 0.000 
-0.0340*** 
(0.0080) 0.000 
_  _  _  _  _  
Experience*QUARTILE3 -0.0312*** (0.0078) 0.000 
-0.0327*** 
(0.0077) 0.000 
_  _  _  _  _  
Ongoing formal training -0.1367 (0.0949) 0.151 
-0.0985 
(0.1089) 0.367 
-0.1364 
(0.1799) 0.449 
-0.4685*** 
(0.1596) 0.004
-0.3530 
(0.2983) 0.238
-0.5131 
(0.3611) 0.157
-0.4418* 
(0.2643) 0.096 
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Table 7: Wage equations with factors (Continued) 
 
Completed formal training 0.1262*** (0.0415) 0.003 
0.1179*** 
(0.0417) 0.005 
0.1594*** 
(0.0575) 0.006 
0.2180*** 
(0.0685) 0.002
0.1897** 
(0.0884) 0.033
0.1413* 
(0.0753) 0.062
0.1510 
(0.1146) 0.189 
Union -0.0541 (0.0391) 0.168 
-0.0420 
(0.0405) 0.301 
-0.1793*** 
(0.0405) 0.003 
-0.0228 
(0.0621) 0.714
0.0033 
(0.0707) 0.963
0.0473 
(0.0777) 0.543
0.0886 
(0.1268) 0.485 
Executive or supervisor 0.1367*** (0.0381) 0.000 
0.1239*** 
(0.0386) 0.002 
0.0764 
(0.0556) 0.171 
0.2842*** 
(0.0621) 0.000
0.2013** 
(0.0902) 0.027
0.3345*** 
(0.0710) 0.000
0.3064*** 
(0.0845) 0.000 
Factor 1 -0.0166** (0.0069) 0.017 
-0.0175* 
(0.0069) 0.105 
0.0127 
(0.0069) 0.557 
_  -0.0544*** (0.0171) 0.002
-0.0561*** 
(0.0144) 0.000
-0.0360** 
(0.0185) 0.052 
Factor 2 0.0392*** (0.0071) 0.000 
0.0506*** 
(0.0082) 0.000 
0.0318** 
(0.0082) 0.021 
_  0.1026*** (0.0343) 0.003
0.1020*** 
(0.0165) 0.000
0.0764*** 
(0.0213) 0.000 
Factor 3 -0.0014 (0.0088) 0.872 
0.0295* 
(0.0173) 0.090 
0.0774* 
(0.0173) 0.083 
_  -0.0121 (0.0141) 0.395
-0.0099 
(0.0214) 0.645
-0.0113 
(0.0227) 0.620 
Sector 
(textiles: 1; IMMEE: 0) 
_  _  _  -0.2470*** (0.0522) 0.000
_  _  _  
Average education 
 in the firm 
_  _  _  0.0621*** (0.0131) 0.000
_  _  _  
Age of the firm _  _  _  -0.0162*** (0.0045) 0.000
_  _  _  
Factor 1*QUARTILE1 _  0.0380* (0.0223) 0.090 
-0.0490 
(0.0543) 0.367 _ 
 _  _  _  
Factor 1*QUARTILE2 _  0.0045 (0.0201) 0.825 
0.0158 
(0.0443) 0.721 _ 
 _  _  _  
Factor 1*QUARTILE3 _  0.0047 (0.0148) 0.750 
-0.0127 
(0.0351) 0.718 _ 
 _  _  _  
Factor 2*QUARTILE1 _  -0.1442** (0.0709) 0.043 
0.3064 
(0.1965) 0.121 _ 
 _  _  _  
Factor 2*QUARTILE2 _  -0.0520 (0.0612) 0.397 
-0.3490* 
(0.1918) 0.070 _ 
 _  _  _  
Factor 2*QUARTILE3 _  -0.0393** (0.0157) 0.013 
-0.0113 
(0.0359) 0.753 _ 
 _  _  _  
Factor 3*QUARTILE1 _  -0.0183 (0.0277) 0.510 
-0.1070 
(0.0806) 0.185 _ 
 _  _  _  
Factor 3*QUARTILE2 _  -0.0485* (0.0267) 0.071 
-0.0595 
(0.0909) 0.514 _ 
 _  _  _  
Factor 3*QUARTILE3 _  -0.0429* (0.0231) 0.065 
-0.1121** 
(0.0576) 0.053 _ 
 _  _  _  
R2 0.923 0.929 0.880 0.754 Pseudo R
2   
     0.40 0.59 0.59 
Observations 231 231 231 231 231 231 231 
Standard errors are given in parenthesis. P-values appear in italic. ***, ** and * mean respectively significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
The instrumented variables in the IV regression (3) are:  Education QUARTILE 1 QUARTILE 2 QUARTILE 3 Education*QUARTILE 1 Education*QUARTILE 2 Education*QUARTILE 3 Factor 1*QUARTILE 1 
Factor1*QUARTILE2 Factor 1*QUARTILE 3 Factor 2*QUARTILE 1 Factor 2*QUARTILE 2 Factor 2*QUARTILE 3 Factor 3*QUARTILE 1 Factor 3*QUARTILE 2 Factor 3*QUARTILE 3 
The additional instruments used in the IV regression (besides the exogenous variables of equation 3) include: age, (age)2, apprenti, celibah, chaine, choma, (choma)2, choma*female, emsim, enft, (enft)2, log(enft), enft*age, 
entree, equipe, formaa, (formaa)2, (formaa)3, formaa*female, forstil*female, mari*female, mari*female, mari*male, panal, panal*age, panal*choma, panal*enft, panal*formaa, pprim, pprim*age, pprim*choma, pprim*enft, 
pprim*formaa, prove, psecon, psecon*age, psecon*choma, psecon*enft, psecon*formaa, psup, psup*age, psup*choma, psup*enft, psup*formaa, staga, (staga)2, (staga)3, stagan, (stagan)2, (stagan)3. 
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The first column reports the OLS estimates. The coefficient of the first factor, largely reflecting the 
textile sector, is statistically significant at 5% level and has a negative sign. This is consistent with the 
fact that in Tunisia the textile sector is the manufacturing industry with the lowest wage. Ceteris 
paribus, workers belonging to this sector experience a lower wage.  
The second factor has a significant positive impact on wage differentials. Since this factor reflects the 
density of each firm’s human capital, the firm’s human capital may generate positive wage externality. 
A worker with a given skill would be more productive and thus, better paid in an environment highly 
endowed in human capital. The third factor, reflecting the firm’s age and its capacity to promote 
innovations and new technology has no significant effect in this specification. 
In the following two regressions (columns 2 and 3), we add the wage quartile dummies and allow 
them to interact with the three factors in order to identify if differentiated effects of factors and 
variables exist across wage groups. The factors’ main results are also reported in Table 4.  
First, from the OLS regression, it appears that the poorest workers (first quartile) benefit from working 
in the textile sector unlike medium and high-wage workers. Second, the poorest workers do not seem 
to take advantage of the firm’s human capital since they experience a negative impact on their wages 
from Factor 2. This result may reflect differences in bargaining power within firms across wage 
groups, or be associated with differences in the human capital role in the tasks across wage groups. It 
could also be interpreted in terms of knowledge diffusion. The transmission of knowledge might be 
reserved for high wage or high skilled workers. Also, the correlation coefficient of Factor 2 with the 
importance of supervision is 0.98, while it is 0.96 with the managerial/staff proportion. Then, the 
negative effect of Factor 2 on the first quartile wage may result from the fact that excessive 
supervision prevents development of human capital externalities because it limits individual 
responsibility and improvement possibilities. The richer and more qualified social categories are the 
ones who benefit the most from the firm’s human capital density. As for Factor 3 (modernity of the 
firm), its impacts on wages emphasizes the same U curve as described earlier for the returns to human 
capital across wage groups. The poorest and richest workers benefit from an innovating environment, 
while workers in the middle of the wage distribution do not.  
The results with 2SLS and quantile regressions show similar features for the positive effect of the 
second factor. However, as expected, because of the accuracy lost in the instrumentation, the 
coefficient of the various equations incorporating factor dummies are often non-significant with the 
2SLS, particularly when factor dummies are interacted with quartile dummies. Finally, the quantile 
regression estimates of factor effects are different in that they are not based on many interacted effects 
of factors and quartiles. In this case, the first factor corresponds to a significant negative effect, the 
second factor to a significant positive effect, while the third factor has no significant impact. These 
results illustrate the differences in the two notions of wage positions, respectively based on wage 
quantiles or wage conditional quantiles. These two notions are associated with the factors’ different 
impacts. 
Finally, we carry out a simple regression by replacing the three factors with three of the firm’s 
characteristics that seem to be better reflecting each of them: a dummy for the textile sector (Factor 1), 
the average education level in the firm (Factor 2) and the firm’s age (Factor 3)30. Using a questionnaire 
addressed to workers (e.g. during an employment survey or a labor force survey), it would be easy to 
collect information on these three characteristics (sector, proxy of average education in this firm, age 
of this firm) and use them afterwards as regressors in the wage equation. We call this regression the 
"pseudo factor" model (PFM, column 4 of Table 7). The coefficients of the three selected variables are 
statistically significant at 1% and have the expected sign. It is interesting to compare the estimators 
obtained from this regression to those drawn from a simple Mincerian model (MM) and a firm fixed 
effects model (FFEM) (Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3). Clearly, it appears that the PFM does very well 
as compared to the FFEM: the returns to human capital obtained from the PFM are closer to those of 
                                                     
30 Eliminating the wage observation of the considered individual in this mean does not change qualitatively the results. 
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the FFEM than to the same returns drawn from the MM. More specifically, the PFM gives a return to 
education similar to that obtained by the FFEM (6.8% compared to 6.9% with the FFEM, while it 
amounts to 8.6% with the MM).  
Let us mention a few points about the estimates with specific quartile effect of the surrogate variables 
that we do not show to save space. There is no significant differentiated effect of the sector variable 
across wage quartiles, unlike the interactions with the average education variable. Indeed, OLS 
estimates display the same U curve across quartiles as for the external effect of mean education on 
wages: this external return is significantly lower for workers belonging to the third quartile than that of 
the richest and poorest workers. Curiously, there is a negative impact of the establishment's age on the 
wages of the richest and poorest workers (-1.8%) while this effect is positive for workers in the second 
(3.9%) and third quartile (3.7%). 
The comparison of estimation results with the firms’ fixed effects with estimation results with factor 
effects is instructive. Indeed, the firms’ fixed effects could be partly interpreted as resulting from 
unobserved human capital characteristics at the firm’s level. Under such assumption, the estimation 
results show that in our data three of the firm’s observable characteristics suffice to account for most 
of the impact of the firm’s effects on wages. As a consequence, the technique proposed in this paper to 
take advantage of matched worker-firm data could also be useful for other applied research when 
matched worker-firm data are not available.  
We obtained returns to education in the equations without the firm’s characteristics that are 
substantially different from the returns to education in equations with the firm’s fixed effects. As in 
Chennouf et al. (1997) for Algeria, the returns to education diminish when the firm’s effects are 
introduced. However, this only occurs when all quarters are considered together. This suggests that it 
is important to consider the different quartiles of the wage distribution. 
Meanwhile, the returns to education obtained with the firm’s fixed effects are almost indistinguishable 
from the returns in equations with factors, and from the returns in equations with mean education 
characteristics of the firms. This suggests that the firm’s effects can be corrected by introducing these 
mean education characteristics if the main interest is to estimate returns to education.  
Finally, the introduction of factors may be used to better interpret the firm dummies in equations with 
the firms’ fixed effects. For example, the characteristics of firm number 1 (respectively firm number 6, 
respectively firm number 7) are very close to that of Factor 1, ‘textile type industry with high export 
orientation’ (respectively Factor 2, ‘high qualification’, respectively Factor 3, ‘modern firm’). 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we study the return to human capital variables for wages of workers observed in 
Tunisian matched worker-firm data in 1999. Thus, our results show how returns to human capital in a 
developing country such as Tunisia differ from industrial countries usually studied with matched data. 
We also develop a new method based on multivariate analysis of firm characteristics. This method 
allows us many of the benefits obtained by introducing firm dummies in wage equations for studying 
the effect of worker’s education. It also provides a human capital interpretation of the effect of these 
dummy variables. Moreover, in the studied data, using three firm characteristics easily collectable 
(average education level of workers, sector, age of the firm) yields results close to those obtained by 
using the matched structure of the data. 
The results show wage equations incorporating the firms’ fixed effects have a better fit than the 
standard Mincer wage functions. All the wage equations show large effects from the firm dummies. 
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With or without controlling for firm characteristics and for possible endogeneity of the education 
variable, the poorest workers (as defined in terms of wages or conditional wages) experience greater 
returns to human capital variables than workers belonging to the middle of the wage distribution. 
However, the return to schooling of the poorest workers is significantly lower than that of the richest 
workers. 
The impact of formal job training on earnings is consistent with general predictions of human capital 
theory: individuals who invest in training during an initial period and receive a lower wage than what 
they could receive elsewhere without training. Workers may collect returns from their investment at a 
later period through higher marginal products and higher wages. 
Using a factor analysis to summarize the information on the surveyed firm, we show the activity sector 
of the firm, its human capital characteristics and modern features concentrate most of the statistical 
information from the employer survey. 
Wage regressions, including the computed factors, confirm that human capital seems to constitute a 
source of positive intra-firm externality on wages. However, the poorest workers do not take 
advantage of the firm human capital. Conversely, the poor benefit from working in the textile sector in 
terms of wages unlike the medium and highly paid workers. Finally, the poorest and richest workers 
benefit from an innovating environment while workers in the middle of the wage distribution do not. 
An alternative interpretation is that the estimated intra-firm externality on wages partially captures the 
role of unobserved physical capital. Indeed, it may be that high human capital and training are 
correlated with high capitalistic intensity across firms. If that is the case, the impacts of human and 
physical firm capital on wages should be analysed jointly. This calls for accurate measurement of 
these two types of variables, notoriously hard to observe. Another possible interpretation of the intra-
firm human capital effects is that it originates from selectivity or matching effects. For example, 
because of specific technologies requiring high skills, some firms hire workers with high human 
capital and pay well this specific human capital. 
What are the policy implications? In the Tunisian context, emerging tensions in the labor market – 
resulting from uncertainty about job tenure and deterioration in relative wages for lower-skilled 
workers – will need to be closely followed through comprehensive monitoring of unemployment, skill 
composition and location. The role of education and formal training is central in dealing efficiently 
with these tensions. One of the outcomes of the estimations is that human capital investment should 
partly proceed through the work organisation and training policy of the firm and not only stem from 
public education policies. 
Moreover, poverty in Tunisia has been found to be more concentrated in the textile sector among 
manufacturing sectors. This is consistent in our data with lower wages observed in the textile sector. 
However, since the return to human capital is particularly high for the poorest workers in this industry, 
it could play a role of skill promoter for low-skilled manpower. Once these workers in this industry 
have raised their productivity by a work period, they may be able to switch to another activity sector in 
search of better remunerations, although we cannot test this hypothesis with our data. 
Finally, what can we expect from public policies using education against poverty and inequality? The 
U-curve of the returns to the different human capital variables in wage equations implies that human 
capital accumulation is likely to help alleviate poverty but may have ambiguous effects on inequality. 
This makes it all the more worrying that Mesnard and Ravallion (2001) found raising inequality in 
Tunisia depletes the aggregate number of business starts-up, and therefore may reduce future 
economic growth. In these conditions, welfare public programs based on reinforcement of workers’ 
skills and knowledge should be accompanied by monitoring benefits that every society class would 
receive from education and training, including in the workplace itself. 
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